Abstract. Public-key cryptosystem (PKC) is one of inevitable key technologies in order to accomplish fruitful security applications in ubiquitous computing systems. The ubiquitous computer only has scarce computational resources (like Smart cards, RFID, Sensor Network), however, so that the light weight PKC is necessary for those miniaturized low-power devices. Recently, XTR is considered as one of good candidates for more energy efficient cryptosystems. Among XTR exponentiation algorithms, the most efficient one is the Improved XTR Single Exponentiation (XTR-ISE) proposed by Stam-Lenstra. Thus among the family of XTR algorithms, XTR-ISE is the most efficient one suitable for ubiquitous computer. Even though the security of such devices against side channel attacks is very dangerous, there are few works on side channel attacks against XTR-ISE. In this paper we propose a new collision attack on XTR-ISE, derived from the structural properties of XTR-ISE. The analysis complexity of the proposed one is about 2 40 where the key size is 160-bit, which is 55% improvement from the previously best known analysis of Page-Stam. We also propose a novel countermeasure using a fixed pattern which is secure against SPA. We deploy a variant of Euclidean algorithm whose one of the registers is a monotone decreasing function with odd value. From our estimation of the efficiency of the proposed method, XTR exponentiation, computing T r(g n ) with T r(g) and n, takes 11.2 log 2 n multiplications in F p 2 . In the sense of both efficiency and security the proposed countermeasure is the best one among the previous countermeasures-it is about 30% faster.
Introduction
We are standing to the beginning of the ubiquitous computing era. It is expected that we can accomplish lucrative applications by effectively synthesizing the ubiquitous computer with cryptography. The ubiquitous computer only has scarce computational resources (like Smart cards, RFID, Sensor Network), so that we have to make an effort to optimize the memory and efficiency of the security system. Our expectation is that secure symmetric encryption will be widely available on the ubiquitous computer of the future, but one of the biggest problems in using secret key algorithms is the protection of the sensitive key material. However, the use of public-key cryptosystem (PKC) facilitates security protocols and has a potential impact on a much wider range of applications.
Furthermore, only the public key would have to be embedded into the target devices. Currently there are a few implementations on ubiquitous environments with PKC. In ESAS 2004 Gaubatz-Kaps-Sunar showed an implementation of Rabin and Ntru in sensor networks [8] . Recently Watro et al. showed RSA (in the case the encryption key is 3) is feasible to the applications of ubiquitous computer, and remarked that XTR is one of good candidates for light weight cryptosystems in SASN 2004 [21] .
However, the applications of ubiquitous computer will be carried into and used in hostile environments and often house sensitive information, for example identity related tokens or financial information, the threat of attack is significant. This threat is magnified by both the potential pay-off and level of anonymity that side channel attacks (SCA) allow [12, 13] . The fact that one can attack a device somewhat remotely via timing and power consumption means that most ubiquitous computing devices need to be aware of similar problems in their operational environments.
In Crypto 2000 Lenstra-Verheul introduced XTR, a cryptosystem using a sub-group of the multiplicative group of F p 6 but with a compact representation based on the trace over F p 2 that allows highly efficient arithmetic [14] . In Crypto 2003, Rubin-Silverberg proposed torus based public key cryptosystem CEILIDH to provide greater efficiency for the same security [17] . Recently, Dijk et al. proposed an optimal communication technique for torus-based cryptosystem [6, 5] . The common main idea of XTR and CEILIDH is to shorten the bandwidth of transmission data. Even though the efficiency of communication of CEILIDH is better than XTR, unfortunately it was shown that CEILIDH seems bound to be inherently slower than XTR [9] . Given the current state of affairs in breaking the discrete logarithm problems over either finite fields or elliptic curves, XTR can compete with elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECC) in terms of both speed and bandwidth. This makes XTR suitable for deployment on similar sorts of constrained devices such as smartcards, where computational power and storage capacity are both very limited. Among XTR exponentiation algorithms, the most efficient one is proposed in [18] , called as Improved XTR Single Exponentiation (XTR-ISE), and that is on average more than 22% faster than the old method. Thus among the family of XTR algorithms, XTR-ISE is the most efficient one suitable for smart-cards, where computational power and memory capacity are both very limited. Even though the security of such devices against side channel attacks is very dangerous, however, there are few works on side channel attacks against XTR-ISE.
In 2004 Chung-Hasan [2] and Page-Stam [16] proposed simple power analysis (SPA) against XTR-ISE and that it was the first try to analyze it with SCA. Chung-Hasan showed it takes 2 100 tries for an attacker until he/she correctly finds the secret key in XTR-ISE with 160-bits key length. On the other hand, Page-Stam showed it requires 2 88 tries. It's more nice result than that of Chung-Hasan, but these results are far worse than well-known square-root type algorithms (Baby-Step-Giant-Step or Pollards' Rho methods), i.e., their results are not practically feasible. Page-Stam introduced the indistinguishable arithmetic formula and the exponent splitting method as SPA and DPA countermeasure. It is considered as the most efficient countermeasure against SPA and DPA among the proposed ones in XTR family.
Contribution of this paper
From the above previous results about XTR-ISE, we are encouraged to start the following two challenges;
(1) Analysis -How can we reduce the complexity of analysis: We can see that the analysis result of Page-Stam and Chung-Hasan are not practically feasible. In this paper we find a new analysis technique, called as XTR collision attack, derived from the structural properties of XTR-ISE. The complexity of XTR collision attack is about 2
0.25·l
where l is the length of the key. Thus the complexity of XTR collision attack against XTR-ISE is about 2 40 where the key length is 160-bit, which is about 55% improvement from the result of Page-Stam [16] .
(2) Countermeasure -How can we design a secure countermeasure against SCA: In the countermeasure of Page-Stam, the indistinguishable arithmetic formula and exponent splitting as a SPA and DPA countermeasure respectively, there are some controversial points.
-Recently Walter showed that the produced unified code for elliptic addition and doubling in order to avoid SPA may still be insecure against SPA if there is sufficient side channel leakage at lower levels [20] . Thus the indistinguishable arithmetic technique is not recommended as a SPA countermeasure. -If Montgomery arithmetic is used in the proposed indistinguishable arithmetic formula then some extra dummy additions have to added to XTR addition routine to make up for this [16] . However, Yen et al. showed that the safe-error attack is applicable to the dummy method [22] .
Thus in this paper we propose a novel countermeasure using a fixed pattern which is secure against SPA. As the behavior of XTR-ISE is based on an adaptation of a Euclidean Algorithm we propose a special Euclidean algorithm such that one parameter is always odd integer and monotone decreasing to construct a fixed pattern of XTR addition A and doubling D. In deed we generate an XTR AD sequence with the fixed pattern such that ADDADD. . .ADD. In order to defeat DPA the exponent splitting technique is utilized. From our estimation of the efficiency of the proposed method, XTR exponentiation, computing T r(g n ) with T r(g) and n, takes 11.2 log 2 n multiplications in F p 2 . In the sense of both efficiency and security the proposed countermeasure is the best one among the previous countermeasures-it is about 30% faster.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. After a brief description of XTR public key systems in Section 2, and an introduction into side channel attacks on XTR in Section 3, we will propose a new analysis technique, called as XTR collision attack in Section 4. In Section 5 we explain the proposed countermeasure using a fixed pattern which is secure against SPA.
XTR Public Key Cryptosystems
In this section, we review mathematics of XTR including basic parameters and fundamental algorithms to calculate traces of powers [14, 18] .
XTR Parameters
Let p and q be primes with p ≡ 2 mod 3 and q dividing p 2 −p+1, and let g be a generator of the order q subgroup of F * p 6 . Suggested lengths to provide adequate levels of security are log 2 q ≈ 160 and log 2 p ≈ 170. As p is 2 modulo 3, it follows that (X 3 − 1)/(X − 1) = X 2 + X + 1 is irreducible over F p and that two roots α and α p form an optimal normal basis for F p 2 over F p , i.e.,
For the simplicity, we denote x = x 1 α + x 2 α 2 as (x 1 , x 2 ).
For an element h ∈ F * p 6 its trace Tr(h) over F p 2 is defined as a sum of the conjugates over F p 2 of h:
XTR-ElGamal encryption
XTR can be used in any cryptosystem that relies on the discrete logarithm problem. This section contains a description of an application of XTR to ElGamal encryption [14] .
Public key data of Alice: p, q, Tr(g), Tr(g k ). Secret key data of Alice:
Encryption Bob can encryption a message M ∈ F p 2 intended for Alice as follows. 
Decryption Using her knowledge of secret key k, Alice decrypts the message (Tr(g r ), E) as follows.
1. Compute Tr(g kr ) ∈ F p 2 with k and T r(g r ). 2. Let K = Tr(g kr ) and find
XTR Exponentiation Algorithm
Throughout this paper, c n denotes Tr(g n ) ∈ F p 2 , for some fixed p and g of order q, where q divides p 2 − p + 1. Note that c 0 = 3 and c 1 = c. An efficient computation of c n for given p, q and c depends on the recurrence relations
and
which is derived from the equation (1) when u = v. By using above two formula, we define the following two functions called as XTR addition and XTR doubling respectively;
Computation time of the basic operations: Let M ul denote the computation time of modulo multiplication in F p and x = (x 1 , x 2 ), y = (y 1 , y 2 ), z = (z 1 , z 2 ), and w = (w 1 , w 2 ) be elements of F p 2 . The basic operations D[x] and A[x, y, z, w] in XTR can be calculated like this [14] .
where
Thus the required number of multiplications to compute D[·] and A[·] is as follows;
Remark 1. As usual, the small number of additions and subtractions is not counted because the computation time of that is negligible [14] .
By using above defined notations we introduce Improved XTR exponentiation algorithms proposed by Stam-Lenstra [18] . The goal of these algorithms is to compute c n for given c 1 and n ∈ Z, i.e. to compute T r(g n ) with T r(g) and an integer n.
Improved XTR Single Exponentiation (XTR-ISE) [18]
Input: c 1 and n where n > 2 Output: c n 1. Initialization:
n) and b = n − a (where round(x) is the integer closest to x). 
As long as
2.3. i ← i + 1 and set Gi = (T0, T1, T2, T3).
5. If a = 1 then returnc 2 f else run Improved XTR Single Exponentiation with c =c 2 f and n = a.
XTR-ISE is based on an adaptation of a Euclidean algorithm by Montgomery using Lucas chains. For ease of notation, we will momentarily use ordinary exponentiation in our description instead of the third order XTR recurrence. Given T r(g) and n, computing T r(g n ) takes 6.7 log 2 n M ul in XTR-ISE. Note that it is the most efficient one among XTR exponentiation algorithms without pre-computation.
Side Channel Attacks
Side channel attacks (SCA) are allowed to access the additional information linked to the operations using the secret key, e.g., timings, power consumptions, etc [12, 13] . This type of attack, which includes Simple Power Analysis (SPA) and Differential Power Analysis (DPA), render cryptographic devices such as smart cards vulnerable.
− In SPA, an attacker just needs to monitor the devices power consumption and identify the parts of the power trace that correspond to the difference of operations using the secret key. This gives trivially the secret key.
− DPA observes many power consumptions and analyzes these information together with statistic tools. An adversary should analyze the information of power consumptions with statistic tools per every target bit, however, he/she does not need re-observe new power consumptions to detect a next target bit because he/she can use the same obtained information.
Side Channel Attacks on XTR and Their Countermeasures
We summarize the previous related results about side channel attacks on XTR and countermeasures. According to target algorithms the proposed analysis techniques and countermeasures are as follows:
XTR Single Exponentiation Method (XTR-SE)
4 : Several side channel attacks such as DPA, the doubling attack, the refined power analysis, and the zero value attack, were proposed by Han et al. [10, 11] . But, it is secure against SPA without any countermeasures. In ICICS 2004, Ciet-Giraud showed that it can be also analyzed by the transient fault induction attacks [1] . As countermeasures against DPA, the exponent randomization, the exponent splitting, the base randomization, and the field randomization techniques were proposed in [10, 11, 16] .
Improved XTR Single Exponentiation Method (XTR-ISE): Chung-Hasan [2] and Page-Stam [16] proposed SPA to XTR-ISE and that it was the first try to analyze it with SCA. Chung-Hasan showed it takes 2 100 tries for an attacker until he/she correctly finds the secret key in XTR-ISE with 160-bits key length. On the other hand, Page-Stam showed it requires 2 88 tries. As countermeasures against SPA and DPA, the indistinguishable arithmetic formula and the exponent splitting, were proposed and recommended as an efficient and adequate SPA and DPA countermeasure respectively [16] . It is the most efficient countermeasure against SPA and DPA among the proposed ones.
Challenges of This Paper
(1) Analysis -How can we reduce the complexity of analysis: The analysis result of Page-Stam is more nice than that of Chung-Hasan, but these results are far worse than well-known square-root type algorithms (Baby-Step-Giant-Step or Pollards' Rho methods), i.e., their results are not practically feasible. In this paper we find new analysis technique, called as XTR collision attack, derived from the structural properties of XTR-ISE. The complexity of XTR collision attack against XTR-ISE is about 2 40 where the key length is 160-bit, which is about 55% improvement from the result of Page-Stam [16] . The description of it is contained Section 4.
(2) Countermeasure -How can we design a secure countermeasure against SCA: Even though Page-Stam's method, the indistinguishable arithmetic formula and exponent splitting as an SPA and DPA countermeasure respectively, is the most efficient countermeasure against SPA and DPA among the proposed ones, there are some controversial points in their method.
-Recently Walter showed that the produced unified code for elliptic addition and doubling in order to avoid SPA may still be insecure against SPA if there is sufficient side channel leakage at lower levels [20] . Thus the indistinguishable arithmetic technique is not recommended as a SPA countermeasure. -If Montgomery arithmetic is used in the proposed indistinguishable arithmetic formula then some extra dummy additions have to added to A[·] routine to make up for this [16] . However, Yen et al. showed that the safe-error attack is applicable to the dummy method [22] .
Thus in this paper we propose a novel countermeasure using a fixed pattern which is secure against SPA. In order to defeat DPA the exponent splitting technique is utilized. In Section 5 we describe the proposed countermeasure.
New Collision Attack on XTR
In this section we find new analysis technique, called as XTR collision attack, derived from the structural properties of XTR-ISE.
Some Properties of XTR-ISE
In XTR-ISE, Step 2 consists of eight states X i and Y i where 1 ≤ i ≤ 4. One state is only determined by the condition of a and b. The following properties give us useful information to determine the next state, and their proof can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 1.
In XTR-ISE, the following relations are satisfied;
1. X 1 is followed by X i and only Y 1 where 1 ≤ i ≤ 4. 2. X 2 is followed by X i where 1 ≤ i ≤ 4. 3. X 3 is followed by X i where 1 ≤ i ≤ 3. 4. X 4 is followed by only Y 3 or Y 4 . 5. Y 1 is followed by X i and only Y 1 where 1 ≤ i ≤ 4. 6. Y 2 is followed by X i where 1 ≤ i ≤ 4. 7. Y 3 is followed by X i where 1 ≤ i ≤ 3. 8. Thus, there is no state which can actually leads to Y 2 's precondition. Thus Y 2 can not be occurred in the process of XTR-ISE except an appearance of the first time. 
Assumptions and Notations
We first introduce some reasonable assumptions which is used in a new attack. and p-th powering is free (refer to Section 2) in XTR, the above Assumption 1 is reasonable. Assumption 3 is also reasonable since this kind of computation usually takes many clock cycles and depends greatly on the value of the operand. This kind assumption has been used in a stronger variant and validated by Schramm et al. [19] who are able to distinguish collisions during one DES round computation. It was extended to ECC by Fouque at al [7] . As described in Section 2.
are carried along for expository purposely only). For example, with input c 1 and n, the utilized operations are 
Attacker's Goal
In XTR-ISE, Step 2 consists of eight states X i and Y i where 1 ≤ i ≤ 4. One state is only determined by the condition of two integers a and b. However, if an attacker can decide the states executed during the computation then the secret key can be easily reconstructed from the recovered state. Note that from the properties of XTR-ISE described in Section 4.1, we do not consider state Y 2 in this attack any more.
Under Assumption 1, an attacker is able to distinguish A, DD, and ADD. With this information he/she can categorize seven states of XTR-ISE into the following three groups; -A is corresponding to X 1 or Y 1 , -DD is corresponding to X 4 , -ADD is corresponding to X 2 , X 3 , Y 3 or Y 4 .
However, there are some ambiguity decisions such as (1) X 1 and Y 1 are not distinguished, (2) if ADD is observed in AD sequence then there are two possibilities; ADD and A|DD. Using a brute force search technique, one might test around 6 candidates; i.e. ADD is corresponding to one of
Thus the attacker needs to check the possible candidates until he/she has found the correct one, so in order to improve the efficiency of the attack we want to minimize the number of candidates.
Analysis based on the Finite Markov Chain
First we consider the following three types of AD sequences; -ADD|DD. 
The proof of it is contained in Appendix.
When ADD|{A} m |ADD is observed in AD sequence there are 6 · 2 m · 6 = 9 · 2 m+2 combinations of XTR states. However, if we consider the finite markov chain (Fig. 1) then the only possible combinations of XTR states are as follows;
Thus the number of possible combinations is 3 · 2 m+1 . Furthermore, we propose the following decision rule derived from Proposition 1. Proof. ADD can be one of {X 2 , X 3 , Y 3 , Y 4 , X 1 |X 4 , Y 1 |X 4 }. As Y 3 and Y 4 's precondition is one of {X 4 , Y 4 }, Y 3 and Y 4 are discarded in candidates. As X 1 |X 4 and Y 1 |X 4 are followed by X 3 or Y 4 these two are also discarded. Thus ADD implies X 2 or X 3 . As Y 1 can not be followed by X 2 or X 3 , A placed after ADD is X 1 . ⊓ ⊔
XTR Collision Attack
At the previous section, the number of possible combinations for {ADD} m and ADD|{A} m |ADD is decreased by using the finite markov chain of XTR-ISE. In this section, in order to reduce the search space from the finite markov chain we introduce a new attack mainly based on the above assumptions, especially Assumption 3, described in 4.2.
Key Observation: If we focus on D operation, we notice that some of them manipulate the same operand. We consider two AD sequences S[c 1 , n] and S[c 2 , n]. 
In order to confirm the validity of this categorization, we consider two examples. Assume that two cases (X 2 , X 3 ) and (Y 4 , Y 3 ). Table 1 shows that in the case of (X 2 , X 3 ) CASE I collision is occurred and CASE II collision is detected in (Y 4 , Y 3 ) . Similarly, other pairs are also categorized into two cases.
With this collision information, an attacker is required to test on average 10.2 (= 12 2 +3 2 15 ) in order to find the precise combination pair corresponding to the target ADDADD. If m = 3, i.e. ADDADDADD, similarly 39 combination pairs are categorized into CASE (I, I), CASE (I, II), and CASE (II, I) and the number of elements of each case is 24, 6, and 9, respectively. Here, CASE (I, I), CASE (I, II), and Assume Gi = (ce, c f , cg, c h ) with input c1 in XTR-ISE.
Step Input c1 and n c2 and n Gi (ce, c f , cg, c h ) (c2e, c 2f , c2g, c 2h )
Step Input c1 and n c2 and n Gi (ce, c f , cg, c h ) (c2e, c 2f , c2g, c 2h ) From the results of the above table we can see that the average number of trial tests with collision information is drastically decreased compared to that of the finite markov chain. For example, if m = 5 then the required number of trial tests is only 18% of that of the finite markov chain.
In the case of ADD|{A} m |ADD: Consider
Similar to the previous analysis, we can observe the following results depending on the combination type; 
With this collision information, an attacker is required to test on average 4.5 (= Implementation Results: From these classifications, we can reduce the search space order required to detect the whole secret value. The graph of results in Fig. 2 shows that the average number of trial XTR exponentiations is roughly given by 2 0.25·l where l is the length of the exponents. Thus the complexity of XTR collision attack against XTR-ISE is about 2 40 where the key length is 160-bit, which is about 55% improvement from the result of Page-Stam [16] . 
Proposed Countermeasure
In this section we explain the proposed algorithm. We modify XTR-ISE to be secure against SCA. The main idea is same to that of Okeya-Takagi scheme [15] for elliptic curve cryptosystems. In XTR-ISE there are three different patterns, A, DD, ADD. For example, if X 1 , Y 1 , and X 4 are consecutively operated then the sequence is "AAADD", which is no longer the fixed pattern. We try to generate a XTR operation sequence that has a fixed pattern such that |ADD|ADD| . . . |ADD|. Firstly we describe the proposed scheme as follows: In order to make "ADD" fixed pattern, first we eliminate X 1 , X 4 , Y 1 , Y 2 from XTR-ISE and then change the condition of input a and b in the initialization step such that the integer a is always odd. For easy explanation of the properties of XTR-FSE, we define some notations; Notations: Let −→ S i+1 denotes S i+1 is updated by X 1 from S i . We derive some properties of XTR-FSE, and their proofs can be found in the appendix. Lemma 1. With input integer n, XTR-FSE has the following properties;
As long as
(1) A i is always odd integer, (2) A i is a monotone decreasing function,
at X 2 and Y 1 , (5) A i + B i = t(A i−1 + B i−1 ) at X 1 and Y 2 , where 1/2 < t < 1, (6) A i + B i is a strictly decreasing function,
Proof. The proof of (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) are immediate and (6) follows from (4) and (5) 
t n for any t. As A i and B i are positive integers the minimum of A i + B i is 2, thus t ≤ log 2 (n) − 1, which proves (7).
⊓ ⊔ Lemma 2. 
Average-case Analysis of Fixed Pattern XTR Single Exponentiation
In this section we will analyze the average number of states of the proposed algorithm. First we prove that the proposed algorithm is polynomial time algorithm, i.e. it is terminated in O(log 2 n) with the input integer n in XTR-FSE. XTR-FSE is a Polynomial Time Algorithm: Let S = S 0 S 1 S 2 · · · be the sequence of S i updated by one of {X 1 , X 2 , Y 1 , Y 2 }. From Lemma 2, we can separate S into several sub-sequences with Y a>3b 1 like as
, where S ki is updated by state Y (3) and Lemma 2, the maximum values of the updated A i and B i are described in Table 2 . 
As max(A i ) and max(B
so that we have proved:
Proposition 2. For a given integer n, the proposed algorithm takes at most 3 log 2 n iterations in Step 2. This implies that it is a polynomial time algorithm.
Heuristic Estimation of XTR-FSE: From now on, we would like to investigate a heuristic estimation result of the proposed algorithm. From Proposition 2 we can assume that the sequence S = S 0 S 1 · · · S m where m ≤ 3 log 2 n. Note that the last S m = (1, 1).
. From the result of (4)- (6) in Lemma 1, we can derive the following equation:
where 1/2 < t < 1. Let t = 3/4. Then the iteration number m is asymptotically logarithmic, m ≈ 1.41 log 2 n.
In order to confirm our estimation result above we show simulation results. We randomly generate one million integers n with bit length 160, 200, 500, 1000, 5000, 10000, respectively. Table 3 demonstrates that our estimation result matches the simulation results (SR) for the large input integer n. 
Security Analysis
In this section we discuss the security of the proposed scheme against SPA and DPA. SPA: As we mentioned previous section, the proposed method compute XTR single exponentiation through the fixed pattern |ADD|ADD| . . . |ADD|. The attacker could distinguish XTR operations D[·] and A[·] in XTR-FSE by measurement of the power consumption, but he/she obtains only the identical ADD sequence for any input c and n. Therefore, he/she cannot detect the secret scalar n by using SPA. DPA: The use of scalar randomization such as exponent splitting [3] prevents against DPA. Note that the idea of splitting the data was already abstracted in [4] as a general countermeasure against DPA. The proposed method is using exponent splitting technique as a DPA countermeasure, i.e. we split the input integer n into two parts by picking a random a ∈ [1, n − 1] and rewriting the integer n as a + (n − a). Thus XTR-FSE is secure against DPA.
Comparison of empirical performance and type of countermeasure
In this section we compare the computational cost and the type of countermeasures between the proposed countermeasure and the previous ones. The compared three methods use the exponent splitting method as DPA countermeasure. But the utilized SPA countermeasure is different each others. The countermeasure of ICICS'04 is based on XTR-SE. Their method does not require SPA countermeasure because XTR-SE has the fixed operations ADD. On the other hand, the countermeasure of SAC'04 and the proposed method is based on XTR-ISE, which does not has fixed operations. In order to solve this problem Page-Stam proposed the indistinguishable arithmetic with dummy operation sometimes, but the security of indistinguishable arithmetic [20] and the dummy method [22] are recently very controversial. From the result of Table 4 our proposed countermeasure is the best one in XTR in the sense of both efficiency and security. 
.
Thus # {ADD} 3 = 3 * (8 + 5). If m = 4 then all possible combinations of {ADD} 4 are 
